## **EXHIBIT 4**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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KELLI D. HAKE, et al.,

CA No. 1:17-cv-00114-TJK

Plaintiffs,

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, April 17, 2018

10:00 a.m.

BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN, et al.,

Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE
HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY J. KELLY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

## APPEARANCES:

v.

For the Plaintiffs: Gary M. Osen, Esq.

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Official Court Reporter U.S. Courthouse, Room 6722 333 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20001

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Proceedings recorded by machine shorthand; transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

## PROCEEDINGS

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Your Honor, this is civil matter 17-114, Kelli D. Hake, et al., v. Bank Markazi, et al.; and civil matter 17-737, Joshua Brooks, et al., v. Bank Markazi, et al.

Counsel, would you please approach the podium and state your appearance for the record.

MR. OSEN: Good morning, Your Honor. Gary Osen for the Hake and Brooks plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Osen. Welcome back.

And I'll note for the record that we do not have anyone here representing anyone -- any of the defendants.

So welcome back, as I said. I hoped we could -- I hope we can make some progress, although I know the procedural posture here of the case is not ideal -- I guess I'll put it that way -- in terms of the related -- well, the potentially related cases floating around that would be more efficient to try to handle in as coordinated a manner as possible. So let me -- I have a couple questions I wanted to ask, and then I'll -- happy to hear your concerns if we don't hit them, and then we'll see if we can't at least try to move the ball forward to some degree today. Does that seem reasonable?

MR. OSEN: Absolutely, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. First on the Field case --

which, I know, is one of the cases we didn't even set today -- do you -- when do you anticipate service or do you anticipate service anytime soon?

MR. OSEN: Right. Your Honor, with respect to Field, the impediment to service is just completion of the translation required into Farsi. We anticipate that being completed at the end of this week. And our estimate is that based on the prior proceedings in Hake and Brooks that the actual default, assuming the defendants don't appear in that case, would occur in early to mid-August.

THE COURT: Okay. And to the extent -- well, to the extent you're able to say -- well, let me ask this first. Hake, Brooks and Field, then, are all, fair to say, very similarly situated in terms of -- obviously, different plaintiffs, but different -- similar -- same defendants -- the same set of or a very similar set of attacks -- events at issue?

MR. OSEN: Yes, the liability elements are identical. In fact, they're literally verbatim the same. The only reason that there are multiple cases is because of the unique aspects of service under the FSIA statute. You can't simply amend because it's a default with the sovereign. So when there's a cumulative number of additional plaintiffs, the safer course is to simply file a new action and serve again through that process. So

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       essentially, they're the same case but with three docket
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       numbers. And, obviously, the last case, Field, has not gone
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       through that additional service and default process.
                 THE COURT: Okav. Is there -- to the extent you
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       can say or know, do you anticipate more cases, kind of,
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       along these lines coming down the pike anytime soon that you
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       might bring?
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                 MR. OSEN: It's impossible to know for sure
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       because the actual universe of individuals who fit the broad
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       parameters of the legal theory are substantially larger than
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       ours. There are a couple of other pending cases brought
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       after ours by firms that follow the same work who have cases
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       pending in this district before other judges. So I don't
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       know what the ultimate total universe is.
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                 THE COURT: Sure.
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                 MR. OSEN: They have certainly not made an effort
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       to consolidate or to file them as related to our cases. So
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       I surmise that they will be content to work off of whatever
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       submissions we --
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                 THE COURT: Right.
                 MR. OSEN: -- make, but it's entirely --
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                 THE COURT: Right.
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                 MR. OSEN: -- possible that they'll, at some
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       point, move to consolidate, as well.
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                 THE COURT: I just meant in terms of you and your
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1 2 MR. OSEN: Yeah. I mean --3 THE COURT: I mean, again, as you say, who -- if other plaintiffs came to you --4 5 MR. OSEN: Right. THE COURT: -- and they were properly situated, 6 7 you would bring them, but --8 MR. OSEN: Right. And, in fact, in -- within the 9 Field case, Your Honor, there are family members of 10 plaintiffs in the prior cases who decided sometimes there are emotional and other issues that determine when or if 11 12 they decide to participate. 13 THE COURT: When you mentioned the other cases 14 with the same theory that are floating around in this 15 courthouse with attorneys other than you, do you mean 16 similar to Karcher -- or are they bank cases or cases 17 directly against Iran or both? 18 MR. OSEN: My recollection is both. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. OSEN: I will say -- although not perhaps 21 germane to Your Honor's question -- that we have spurred a, 22 sort of, mini subarea by our initial filing, beginning with Karcher and then with Hake. There have been a number of 23 24 other cases that have followed suit. So I have lost track 25 of the number of them, but there are certainly a half-dozen

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       or so.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. And is it fair to say that the
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       first -- the oldest of this whole set of cases is the
       Karcher case?
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                 MR. OSEN: Yes.
                 THE COURT: Okay. To the extent you, you know --
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       as I try to figure out -- I have at least one other FSIA
       case that is older than even any of yours --
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                 MR. OSEN: Right.
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                 THE COURT: -- that I want to try to move -- make,
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       you know -- move first, just because of the oldness of it.
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       And, you know, obviously, Judge Kotelly has had the Karcher
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       case for quite a while. Do you -- I've looked at the docket
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       in that case. Do you plan -- and I know my understanding
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       of, sort of, how this came about was you all, I think, when
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       this case -- when these cases -- Hake and your other
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       cases -- were filed, you had requested that they be
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       consolidated with Karcher and -- or as related to Karcher
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       and Judge Kotelly thought otherwise; is that -- is my memory
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       correct?
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                 MR. OSEN: Well, I can't speak to whether it was
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       Judge Kollar-Kotelly or the Clerk's --
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                 THE COURT: Or just the --
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                 MR. OSEN: -- office or --
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Okay.
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                MR. OSEN: -- whatever, but --
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                 THE COURT: Fair enough.
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                MR. OSEN: -- yes, we did file them as related,
      but they ultimately got --
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                 THE COURT: Right.
                MR. OSEN: -- dispersed and I believe Judge
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      Lamberth has --
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                 THE COURT: Yes.
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                MR. OSEN: -- one of those.
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                 THE COURT: That's right. Yeah. Do you -- to the
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       extent you want to say, have you thought about moving before
       Judge Kotelly to consolidate these other ones? Obviously,
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       it would be her -- that's the oldest case. It would be her
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      decision and not mine or any other judge's and that's a --
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                MR. OSEN: Yeah.
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                 THE COURT: -- kind of, a litigation strategy
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       question that I wouldn't blame you if you didn't want to say
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      now, but I'm trying to get a sense of --
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                MR. OSEN: Right.
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                 THE COURT: -- you know, whether that's likely to
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      happen.
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                MR. OSEN: Your Honor, all I can say is that we've
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       advised both chambers of the, sort of, parallel proceedings.
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       From our standpoint, it's not really a, sort of, strategic
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       question. It's simply that, you know, our interest is in
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having the cases presented in some court and there's also an added element that the -- as the Court may be aware, there's something called the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund/Act. The actual official name -- I had to write it down because they're strangely different. The act is actually the Justice for Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, 42 U.S.C. 10609, and that created a fund in 2015 wherein civil forfeitures that the United States Department of Justice collected in various state-sponsored sanctions cases would be, in part, deployed to pay out on some of these judgments. And so obviously, the Hake plaintiffs and the Karcher plaintiffs are too late for the original filings back in 2016, but the fund has a new, sort of, payment schedule beginning in, I think, January 1st of 2019. So it had been our hope last year to obtain a judgment to the extent the evidence supports it in time for them to be able to apply to the fund.

Realistically, I'm not sure that's still possible in either Karcher or Hake, at least not for all of the plaintiffs. It's conceivable that if Your Honor or Judge Kollar-Kotelly were able to separate at least the estate or wrongful death claims from those of the injured, those conceivably, I suppose, could be administered still in this calendar year only because, typically, courts in this district have used a fairly straightforward formula for

assessing damages in those kinds of cases, unless, for example, you have, as we do occasionally, a plaintiff who didn't die instantaneously and there's issues of how long they survived and their individual suffering, but in most wrongful death cases, it's a fairly established formula which doesn't necessarily necessitate a special master or a more involved damages finding. Obviously, with respect to soldiers who were wounded in these cases, there's no avoiding a case-by-case workup. So it may be at least conceivable that we might be able, with the Court's indulgence and consent, to obtain a partial judgment at least -- full judgment but for a subset of the plaintiffs who could still be eligible under the program.

THE COURT: The program ends at a certain point?

You had, sort of, said it -- I thought you said it begins in
'19.

MR. OSEN: Yes. It's a fairly unusual administrative formula, as I understand it; that is, as I understand the special master appointed, every two years or so, they take whatever funds are in the fund at that time and deal with the applications then pending and they exhaust the fund and then, thankfully, there are many corporations that conduct sanctions evasion and are caught by the government and, therefore, the fund is periodically replenished by new tortfeasors. So it's not to say that if

they don't submit or have a judgment before December 31st,
they will forever be barred. They'll just be subject to
whatever law enforcement may someday further discover in
future cases.

THE COURT: Okay. Could I ask you about the -- so
putting aside, then, the fact that you've got Field coming
which would be -- it would be, you know, in a perfect world,

MR. OSEN: Sure.

handled with these matters --

THE COURT: -- Karcher is out there beyond my control, older case, a little further developed in terms of what you've filed with Judge Kotelly. The -- obviously, the difference between, you know, this judge -- between Karcher and this case is the bank issue. Is there -- one thing, as I'm getting up to speed just on how to do this efficiently -- well, how to do it at all and how to do it most efficiently, I think, you know, what I noticed was, obviously, the bank being the delta between the Karcher case and this case. Could you talk a little bit about just what you understand you have to prove in terms of the bank. So --

MR. OSEN: Sure.

THE COURT: -- you know, obviously, you have to -
I think it's -- as you had moved in the motion you have

pending, the -- or, maybe, you didn't move on the --

actually, on this fact -- on this point, but there are a lot of cases that will establish that these banks were instrumentalities of Iran. But the issue being beyond that in terms of these specific plaintiffs, what is the nexus? In other words, is it enough to prove that the bank materially supported terrorism? And then do you have to -- what's the connection between the bank's financing of the terrorism and the specific acts of terrorism in the case? How close does that nexus have to be? Are there courts out there -- and I'll hear from you and I think, if it's -- if it makes sense with you, I may ask you to submit something just so I can, you know --

MS. OSEN: Sure.

think, is not as -- I don't want to say cookie cutter,
but is a little bit different than some of the other cases
I've seen -- to see, are there courts in this jurisdiction
or elsewhere that have said, Yes, you've gotten over the
hump, and what you had to prove? And, maybe, some courts
have said, No, you weren't able to, kind of, connect those
dots.

MR. OSEN: Right. I think the elements of proof are the same under the statute because, as instrumentalities of Iran, the same elements under 1605A are present. So it's not that there's a heightened level of proximate cause or

scienter or anything like that; however, I think Your Honor is driving at the question of whether it's simply sufficient that they are alter egos or instrumentalities of Iran or did they have to have some connection to the actual claims and injuries in this case, and I think the answer is yes. These defendants were named in the complaint -- or I should say complaints because of their role in facilitating financing both to Hezbollah and to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC. And those two organizations -- one of which is simply an extension of Iran itself and the other its willing agent -- are the primary parties responsible for these attacks.

So our contention -- and it's based on government findings and designations -- is that the Central Bank of Iran centrally moved large sums of money through -- including Bank Melli -- large sums of money to the IRGC and to Hezbollah and Iran actually generates most of that dollar-denominated revenue that it shares with these entities through sales of oil by the National Iranian Oil Company which, during the relevant time period, the United States Government found to be controlled by the IRGC itself. So that's essentially the allegations in the complaints and that is why they are tied directly and not, sort of, incidentally by ownership to the allegations and the injuries of the plaintiffs.

1 THE COURT: So you would prove money directed from -- by Iran through -- from the banks to Hezbollah, to the 2 3 IRGC and then connect those two groups to the attacks? MR. OSEN: Correct. We don't profess to be able 4 5 to tie the specific funds transfers to particular attacks --THE COURT: Right. 6 7 MR. OSEN: -- but certainly to the groups that were instrumental in carrying them out. 8 9 THE COURT: And that's a, sort of, chain of 10 causation, if you will, that is well-established, I assume, in the -- I don't know -- how -- I shouldn't ask you this 11 leading question. Are there, you know -- I -- obviously, 12 13 there are -- I know there's been -- there's a lot of case 14 law in this courthouse and elsewhere about Iran itself. 15 What is the universe of cases out there that you're aware 16 of -- I know you specialize in this work -- where they've 17 held these kind of banks liable on this theory as you've 18 described it? 19 MR. OSEN: Well, there are a couple of cases both 20 in this Circuit and in the Second Circuit in the SDNY where 21 various entities -- including some subset of these 22 defendants, but others similarly situated -- have been found 23 liable in default cases for their involvement in supporting Iran's terrorist activity. In fact, one of those cases is 24 25 actually the FSIA component of the 9/11 litigation. I think

It might be the Havlish case. The issue with respect to

Iran itself or its instrumentalities in terms of the, sort

of, standard of pleading for causation is essentially the

same; that is to say, in some cases -- and this is one of

them, and the Marine barracks bombing case in Peterson is

another -- where Iran itself plays a direct and active role

in the commission of the attack. That's not always the

case. And I would say the majority of -- well, I hesitate

to quantify it, but a substantial number -- maybe, a

majority of the cases where Iran has been found liable, it's

been for giving support to other terrorist organizations

who, then, commit the attacks, and that may come in the form

of financial support or training, but not direction of the

attacks.

The Marine barracks case was one where the court found that the IRGC actively assisted in the positioning and structure of the bomb that was so effective and devastating in that attack and here, too, for purposes of Karcher. The principal munition used, it was an EFP -- an explosively formed penetrator -- which is a signature Hezbollah-tested-and-designed but Iranian-manufactured weapon. So -- but the, sort of, levels of closeness in the chain are, I think, at their heightened level when you're dealing with Iranian operatives and agents participating in the actual criminal acts, but in most cases, including

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       several in the last year or two in this court, the typical
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       Iranian FSIA case involves general support established by
       Iran to groups like Hezbollah or Islamic Jihad or, for that
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       matter, al-Oaeda or other groups in which they've provided
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       financing generally or training or both. And so under
       1605A, the statute uses the same definition of material
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       support that is contained in the ATA -- in the
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       Anti-Terrorism Act, 2339A -- which is to say donations,
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       financial services, training, all of the, sort of,
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       activities that fall under the rubric of material support.
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       So in this case, the banks are in the same position.
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       They're providing material support to the entities and
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       individuals who facilitated the attacks which is squarely
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       within the -- within 1605A and the, sort of, general case
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       law on this issue.
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                 THE COURT: So it's almost, you know -- as you're
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       describing it, it's -- the state or the state-sponsored
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       entity provides support to the terrorist entity -- material
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       support -- and, after that, it's almost vicarious liability
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       for that terrorist activity.
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                 MR. OSEN: Yes, for the -- obviously, limited by
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       the foreseeability --
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                 THE COURT: Foreseeability --
                 MR. OSEN: -- issue and --
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                 THE COURT: Yep.
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MR. OSEN: -- and this -- and, I think, general proximate cause principles still apply. De minimis support or --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. OSEN: -- you know, if you gave \$10 10 years before is, obviously, the far end of the continuum. The closer in time, the more substantial the support, the more foreseeable it is.

THE COURT: Okay. And, again, your -- and your point being also that your theory here is actually more direct than that, because you would have evidence of the State of Iran being, you know, directly involved in some of these attacks.

MR. OSEN: Yes. I mean, our contention is supported by, I think, substantial government findings and, depending on how it's presented -- either by affidavit or live testimony -- from military/former military officials, and people from the explosive ordnance disposal units, EOD, in Iraq confirmed that the vast majority -- in the vast majority of cases relevant to these complaints, the victim was killed or injured by an EFP, and those are a very specific signature weapon of the Iranians, without spoiling the -- giving a spoiler alert here, the actual manufacturer of these weapons. They're sometimes mischaracterized in, sort of, common parlance as IEDs which are improvised

explosive devices, but they're not improvised, and that's why the Army and the U.S. military doesn't treat them as such. They are weapons-grade, precision-manufactured devices that -- for various reasons in physics involving how quickly C-4 and other high explosives heat and the type of metal you have to use and the precise angling of the plates that become the slugs that are used. These are designed to be armor killers, and they were tested by Hezbollah against Israeli armor first and then deployed with lethal precision in Iraq from roughly the end of 2004 to 2011 with devastating effect --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. OSEN: -- because, you know, the fatalities and injuries resulting from these weapons was vastly greater than that of the, sort of, what you would call improvised or homemade explosives that were typically used by Sunni insurgents and the like. These were targeted and intended to kill U.S. personnel. And the U.S. Government, in -- through a variety of means, some which we can discuss and some which are not public, felt and disclosed publicly that these are unquestionably of Iranian origin, manufacture and supply.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Can I ask you a -so that's great. That at least educates me as far as the
bank issue. And it might make sense to have you just, sort

1 of, submit something along those lines --2 MR. OSEN: Absolutely. 3 THE COURT: -- if we're going to be -particularly since that's the piece of this that is 4 5 different than Karcher that I -- if I can educate myself; be totally comfortable with that, it will save time going 6 7 forward, I think. MR. OSEN: We'll be happy to do that, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 The other thing I have pending from you is the 11 motion to take judicial notice of facts. And my question about that is, as I read some of the cases it cites, 12 13 including the -- I think, the main case from Judge Lamberth 14 about this, as I understand it, the -- what a court is 15 permitted to do is look at the evidentiary -- I mean, I can 16 take judicial notice of the fact that an opinion exists, but 17 I've got to look at the evidentiary record. I can take 18 judicial notice of the evidentiary record in a case and, 19 from that, make certain factual findings that obviate the 20 need for you to re-present the same evidence; is that a fair 21 statement? 22 MR. OSEN: Yes. I would just add to that, Your 23 Honor, that this is, sort of, a boilerplate requirement in 24 most FSIA cases that you make such a submission, kind of, on

the theory that it's always been done. In practice, most of

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the submissions on those kinds of issues involve the fact
that Iran is a state-sponsored-designated, and remains so,
or that Hezbollah is an FTO-designated under the Immigration
and Naturalization Act and so forth, things that, frankly,
are going to be repeated in the proceeding one way or the
other regardless. So I think it's conceived of as a
timesaver and, maybe, in certain circumstances, it is, but
in practical terms for our case, we do it more as a
formality. We don't anticipate, you know, the Court having
to depend on those kinds of notices when, you know, we make
those submissions in the ordinary course of the larger
presentation.
          THE COURT: Okay. That makes sense. I, you know
-- I don't like to have, you know, motions hanging out
there, you know? I'd like to try to address them as soon as
I can. And the thing that struck me as I read through it
was simply -- and I take your point that it was more, sort
of, a pro forma way of going about these cases. If I was --
and I want to be as efficient and save time if I can, but I
would need to look at, I think, a broader, you know,
evidentiary record in each of those cases to, kind of --
         MR. OSEN: Sure. Where this --
          THE COURT: -- check the box and say --
         MR. OSEN: Where this comes up a little bit is,
Your Honor, that -- especially in Peterson with the Marine
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barracks, after Congress amended the statute and that allowed additional plaintiffs to come in after the statute of limitations. The question presented to the original Peterson court was -- and to any judge who had a similar case was, do I have to put on all the evidence again or can we take judicial notice of certain findings and so forth? And so there are certainly circumstances where even though evidence has to be established under the statute, you don't want to reinvent the wheel. Here, I think it's really not a significant issue. So almost anything we would -- I think we were pretty sparse in what we put forward, but they're so elemental as you would review it anyway. So I don't think it saves much time either way. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. But depending upon how, you know, the Karcher case plays out --MR. OSEN: Then we might --THE COURT: -- we might have -- I mean, I, you know -- in a perfect world -- well, not in a perfect world. You're not going to put on all that evidence twice. So you know, that's why I would like to -- well, let's put it this way. Going forward, if you get word from Judge Kotelly about how she's going to handle that -- of course, we'll be watching the docket, too, but -- be sure to, I guess, file something on our -- I'm sure you would, but --MR. OSEN: Right.

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                 THE COURT: -- be sure to let us know. You could
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       call, but I think the easier thing to do is just file a
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       one-page document that, whatever development happens
       there -- if she sets it for a particular day or time --
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       whatever developments would be helpful --
                MR. OSEN: Right.
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                 THE COURT: -- to know.
                MR. OSEN: Yeah. From our standpoint, Your Honor,
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       it's really not a great burden, especially on the papers, to
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       litigate each case, you know? It -- the --
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                THE COURT: Right.
                MR. OSEN: But it makes absolutely no sense from a
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       court standpoint. So it's really -- this is -- litigants
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       always say they're concerned for judicial efficiency --
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                 THE COURT: Yeah.
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                MR. OSEN: -- which is usually their way of
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       saying, Do it the way we want it --
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                 THE COURT: Right. Right.
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                 MR. OSEN: -- but here, it really is much more so
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       for the Court than for us. We can change the captions and
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       add some details. It wouldn't trouble us greatly, but it
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      makes absolutely no sense for the Court to do this work
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       twice.
                 THE COURT: Well, look, and your victims don't
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      want to testify twice. I mean, you know, it -- to the
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       extent you're putting -- eventually, when we get on the
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       other side of it, and even your experts and whatnot.
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                MR. OSEN: Oh, I assure you, the experts are happy
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       to --
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                 THE COURT: Yeah, that's true. Your experts would
       show up -- yeah, that's right. They would show up just
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       about anywhere to give the testimony they're going to give
      here.
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                All right. So what I -- what would you suggest I
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      do, then, with the pending motion, just don't address it for
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       now? It's going to be overtaken by events when we end up
      getting into the heart of the case. As far as that pending
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      motion to take judicial notice of certain facts --
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                MR. OSEN: Oh, yeah --
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                 THE COURT: There's --
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                MR. OSEN: -- I think that just -- that has --
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                 THE COURT: -- just --
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                MR. OSEN: You'll take judicial notice if and when
       you're -- you issue the overall --
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                 THE COURT: Right.
                 MR. OSEN: -- findings of fact and so forth.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. Okay. So I'll
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       let that go. I will go ahead and, I think, again, given
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       that I have at least one other case I want to try to set and
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       so actually, you -- I won't, you know -- hopefully, these
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cases won't be my first FSIA case when it -- when they come. So I'll have been broken in a little bit. Given that and given that Judge Kotelly has had that case -- that's an older case -- I mean, I think what I'd like to do is use the next little period of time -- I guess, you can get the Field folks -- get service wrapped up there and I'll -- I will put in a minute order and ask you to -- give you plenty of time, you know, 30 or 45 or 60 days -- to just brief this bank issue to, you know, again, just -- it sounds like, actually, it's not the curve ball I really thought it was and particularly here, but I think it would be helpful to, sort of --

MR. OSEN: The only thing I would say, Your Honor, is, because of the likely time frame involved, ordinarily, in a more expedited proceeding where we didn't have Karcher and there wasn't Fields and we were, kind of, just on our own and it was a, sort of, more routine matter, I would say to you that we would either, by expert or by affidavit, submit sufficient evidence to support the claims against the banks. Based on the fact that we have additional time, I would ask Your Honor to consider whether you'd be open to limited discovery for those claims. Again, it was probably not necessary. I can't represent that without it, we can't make our case, but, you know, typically, in an FSIA action, these submissions are based on government findings alone --

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government records and reports and the like -- and expert
testimony and not the actual transactional records involved.
If I have time to spare and I am not rushing because I don't
have the same prospect of an imminent entry of judgment,
then at least a limited opportunity to actually request
third-party records is actually of interest because 99
percent of this kind of financing is cleared in U.S. dollars
which means there is responsive records somewhere in the
United States. Obviously, I can't tell you it's absolutely
necessary to be able to satisfy our burden, but if I know
that realistically, until Fields, for example, is in the
same posture, there's -- and you have another case before
this one going, then, you know, I would love to be able to
supplement the record to the maximum extent possible.
          THE COURT: Is there a -- the only -- so that
seems perfectly reasonable to me. I guess I'd have to see
-- you mentioned -- I don't know what the -- as you
represented, you couldn't, you know -- you could not
represent that it was absolutely necessary to your case.
don't know. Is that the -- I don't -- offhanded -- and I
don't even know if, in these -- this particular -- these
particular cases, the standard is different, but it, you
know -- do you know what the -- offhand what the standard is
for this kind of third-party discovery?
          MR. OSEN: Well, the -- I don't think there's a
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1
       separate standard --
2
                 THE COURT: So it's --
 3
                 MR. OSEN: -- for it. The issue is that for
       purposes of an FSIA case, Your Honor has a relaxed
 4
 5
       evidentiary standard. It, you know -- so we'll have
 6
       admissible evidence and, you know, it's sufficient, I think,
 7
       obviously, to meet that hurdle, but in terms of its
 8
       relevance and scope, I think what we're talking about is
 9
       clearly, you know, contemplated in the federal rules. So I
10
       don't think that's the issue. It's just a question of, you
11
       know, you might entertain a greater scope or a longer period
12
       or --
13
                 THE COURT: Right.
14
                 MR. OSEN: -- you know, you might take a different
15
      view of objections if they come in knowing that, you know,
16
      we're not trying to prove that a specific person, you
17
       know -- let's say, a bank officer -- knowingly -- that level
18
       of knowledge and so forth isn't required. So --
19
                 THE COURT: Right.
20
                 MR. OSEN: -- I would imagine, if that issue came
21
      before you, you'd be less -- you would feel the --
                 THE COURT: Sure.
22
23
                 MR. OSEN: -- issue is less compelling --
24
                 THE COURT: Sure.
25
                 MR. OSEN: -- to require additional follow-up --
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1
                 THE COURT: But that doesn't mean you can't take
2
       your shot and --
 3
                 MR. OSEN: Right.
                 THE COURT: -- sort of, see what happens. No,
 4
 5
       that's fine, then. I think, given, as you stated, kind of,
      where we are procedurally on both ends here, I would say
 6
 7
       file a motion and I'll take it up and you can lay out what
       discovery you're anticipating you'd like to pursue and I'll
 8
9
       take it up promptly.
10
                 MR. OSEN: Okay. Thank you.
11
                 THE COURT: So yes. So we'll wait for the --
12
      we'll have Field, hopefully, served by August. As you
13
      mentioned, the pending motion, not critical. I will do, in
14
       a minute order -- ask you to just, sort of, tee up this bank
15
       theory. Not proof, you know? Not proof --
16
                 MR. OSEN: No, I understand, Your Honor.
17
                 THE COURT: -- just show, you know -- walk me
18
       through what you think you --
19
                 MR. OSEN: What the legal elements are --
20
                 THE COURT: Yeah, the legal elements. And if, you
21
       know -- I think, in these cases, too -- like you mentioned,
22
      not reinventing the wheel -- to the extent you can point us
23
       to other cases where they were in a similar posture --
24
       obviously, not necessarily with the same posture in terms of
25
       the particular --
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1 MR. OSEN: Sure. 2 THE COURT: -- weapons or, you know, the particular -- the EFPs, but the same basic posture --3 MR. OSEN: We'll identify cases where 4 5 instrumentalities have been involved; have been sued in their separate capacity; what the elements of proof are 6 7 under the statute and the like and --THE COURT: Yep, and courts that have found that 8 9 that was satisfied. That, I think, would be -- I think 10 that's worth our time --11 MR. OSEN: Absolutely. THE COURT: -- during this period. And let us 12 13 know if anything happens with Judge Kotelly. And what I'll 14 do, maybe, then, is -- since you mentioned August, why don't 15 I ask you to -- I'll find a date in September to just have 16 you give us a status report. 17 MR. OSEN: Okay. 18 THE COURT: The status report could include 19 service and, I assume by that time, I'll have granted your 20 motion for discovery, I anticipate, and you can give, you 21 know -- instead of coming all the way down here, at least on 22 paper, you could give us an update on where discovery is. 23 MR. OSEN: Sure. 24 THE COURT: That way, I can -- we can make sure 25 things are percolating ahead and -- but you might not have

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1
       to come all the way down.
2
                 MR. OSEN: I appreciate that, Your Honor. And
 3
      probably -- I haven't thought this far ahead, but probably,
      we would submit in our motion for discovery, sort of, a
 4
 5
       closing date, too, so that it's --
                 THE COURT: Right.
 6
 7
                 MR. OSEN: -- not an open-ended --
                 THE COURT: Yeah.
 8
 9
                 MR > OSEN: -- proceeding.
10
                 THE COURT: No, that's -- that sounds perfect.
                 So I've gone through all of the questions and
11
       issues that had come to mind. Is there anything else you
12
13
       think I need to address?
14
                 MR. OSEN: No, I think that covers it all.
15
                 THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate you coming down.
16
      As I said, maybe, next time, maybe, right -- say, in
17
       September, maybe, right after you anticipate, maybe, having
18
       some -- having completed service, I'll ask for a -- I'll
19
       issue an order in all the cases asking for, kind of, an
20
       update. We'll get an update on discovery; we'll see where
       Judge Kotelly is; and we'll, kind of, go from there.
21
22
                 MR. OSEN: Right. Thank you very much, Your
23
       Honor.
                 THE COURT: Absolutely. If there's nothing
24
25
       further, then, counsel's dismissed.
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1	MR. OSEN: Okay. Thank you.
2	THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise. This Honorable Court
3	is in recess.
4	(Proceedings concluded at 10:47 a.m.)
5	* * * * * * * * * *
6	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
7	I, TIMOTHY R. MILLER, RPR, CRR, NJ-CCR, do hereby certify
8	that the above and foregoing constitutes a true and accurate
9	transcript of my stenographic notes and is a full, true and
LO	complete transcript of the proceedings to the best of my
L1	ability, dated this 10th day of September 2018.
L2	/s/Timothy R. Miller, RPR, CRR, NJ-CCR Official Court Reporter
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